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I. INTRODUCTION
T he debate regarding whether copyright protection should be granted
to soundalike musical recordings, while not new, remains unan-
swered. The Midler v. Ford Motor Co. decision illustrates this debate.'
The court decided Midler on a state piracy basis because although copy-
I Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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right protection protects "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression" under §102(a), a voice is not copy-
rightable outside of when it is fixed.
2
This article suggests that copyright law can cover soundalike mu-
sical recordings. First, the facts and holding of Midler will be discussed
as well as the court's motivation for not deciding the case on a copy-
right infringement basis. Second, an historical background for copyright
infringement of music follows. This section involves a discussion of
copyright infringement, parody, and fair use as well as a summary of
existing case law regarding each topic.
After an illustration of the dilemma of what copyright may protect
involving the jazz-rock band Blood, Sweat & Tears, the focus shifts to
what could have been done to protect Bette Midler's voice by means
of copyright law. This section involves an analysis of why the Midler
court declined to regard that case as involving infringement, parody, or
fair use issues. Also encompassed within this section is a discussion of
why copyright protection is necessary and proper for celebrity soun-
dalike recordings.
The final section extends copyright protection to Midler's voice
based on the "look and feel" concept associated with computer pro-
gramming as well as the principles discussed in the Altai case.3 The
argument in this area suggests that 1) because copyright protects an
underlying work, a performance, and a recording, why not the "look
and feel" of these elements?; and 2) that the Altai principles of abstrac-
tion, filtration, and comparison are applicable to a Midler-type situation.
Finally, a brief note about the scope of this article is in order. The
broadcast analysis of soundalike recordings would encompass a dis-
cussion of digital sampling. However, because the author's perspective
is that of a musician, the focus of the article is primarily on music and
only incidentally, technology. Second, a soundalike recording, as de-
fined for the purposes of the following discussion may involve not only
a singer's voice, but also production techniques, the original composi-
tion and so forth.
II. THE MIDLER CASE: ITS FACTS, HOLDING AND DISCUSSION OF
STATE PIRACY LAW
Young and Rubicam Advertising, Inc. (Y&R) was responsible for
creating an advertisement for the Ford Motor Company. Y&R chose
2 17 U.S.C. §102 (1976).
3 Computer Associates International Inc. v. Altai Inc., 23 U.S.P.Q. 1241 (2nd Cir. 1992).
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"Do You Want to Dance" as a song to be used as background music
for a Mercury Sable Commercial. Y&R purchased a copyright license
from the copyright holder and paid $45,000 to the writer's publishing
company.
4
Y&R intended to hire Bette Midler, an original performer of the
song, to sing it for the commercial. Consistent with Midler's policy
never to authorize the use of her name, likeness, or music for any
commercial endorsements in the United States, she declined.
Y&R went ahead with the commercial and hired a singer who very
successfully imitated Midler's voice. Midler then sued Ford Motor
Company and Y&R for the unauthorized use of her vocal sound in their
commercial. At issue in the case was the protection of Midler's voice.
The district court described the defendants' conduct as that "of the
average thief.' '6 The court nonetheless believed that no legal principle
existed that prevented imitation of Midler's voice and so gave summary
judgment for the defendants.' Midler appealed.
The appellate court, in discussing federal copyright law, first noted
that "mere imitation of a recorded performance would not constitute a
copyright infringement even where one performer deliberately sets out
to simulate another's performance as exactly as possible." 8 Because
Midler did not seek damages for Ford's use of "Do You Want to
Dance," federal copyright law did not preempt her claim. 9 Midler's
voice falls within the scope of California piracy law because California
recognizes an injury from an appropriation of the attributes of one's
identity.' 0 In this way, the defendants used an imitation to convey the
impression that Midler was singing for them. What they sought was an
attribute of Midler's identity. Its value was what the market would have
paid for Midler to have sung the commercial in person."I
A voice is something that is distinctive, personal, and is one of
the most palpable ways identity is manifested. It is for this reason that
the appellate court held that when a distinctive voice of a professional
4 Midler, at 462.
5 Id. at 461.
6 Id. at 462.
7 Id.
8 Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 17 U.S.C.A. §114(b) and Id. at 462.
9 Midler, at 462.
10 Id. at 463. California Civil Code §990(b) protects the use of a deceased person's name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness and states that it recognizes property rights. By analogy, the
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singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a
product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have com-
mitted a tort in California. 12 Midler made a showing, sufficient to defeat
summary judgment, that the defendants for their own profit in selling
their product appropriated part of her identity. 3
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT IN
Music
A. Infringement of copyright for musical compositions
1. Elements of proof
Fermata International Melodies v. Champions Golf Club'4 lists the
elements of proof for infringement for musical compositions: originality
and authorship of the compositions; compliance with all formalities
required to secure copyright; that plaintiffs are proprietors of the copy-
right; that compositions were performed publicly for profit by defen-
dants; and that defendants did not receive permission from plaintiffs or
their representatives, and a certified copy of the composition is prima
facie evidence of the first three elements. 5
The policy underpinning such a test can be inferred as follows:
Until the Copyright Act of 1976, record piracy was a serious problem
because the performers and producers had no copyright that was in-
fringed; likewise, the composer only had the right to the statutory roy-
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Fermata Intern. Melodies v. Champions Golf Club, 712 F.Supp. 1257 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
15 Id. Fermata involved the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP)
filing a copyright infringement action against Champions Golf Club, Inc. and its president. ASCAP
alleged that Champions allowed the unauthorized public performance of ASCAP's copyrighted
songs in a restaurant of the Champions Golf Club. Champions did not dispute whether ASCAP
were the owners of the valid copyrights in the musical compositions in question. In addition,
Champions did not dispute that the compositions were performed or that Champions did not receive
permission from ASCAP.
The only issue was whether the compositions were performed "publicly" within §101 of the
Copyright Act. A performance is "public" if "at a place open to the public or at any place where
a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances
is gathered." 17 U.S.C.A. §101.
The court held that the performance of copyrighted musical compositions at a private golf club
before 21 members and guests was "public" for purposes of copyright infringement; that no waiver
or estoppel existed by reason of the copyright owners' representative to provide a complete list of
music that it licensed; that the officer of the club was jointly and severally liable for the copyright
violation; and that statutory damages of $8,000 were warranted, together with an injunction and
attorney fees.
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alty and upon payment, had few other remedies.16 Along with the
Copyright Act, the Fermata test serves to protect the creativity of com-
posers and also draws a boundary between permissible and impermis-
sible conduct of would-be infringers. Because the Fermata court only
intended the test to cover compositions, another court would have to
apply the test to cover performances and recordings. In absence of such
an existing application, copyright law itself protects performances and
recordings. 17
2. Limitations of copyright protection
Currently, copyright law protects an artist's performance, an un-
derlying recording, and a composition. However, copyright infringe-
ment can still be achieved because of limitations in the Copyright Act.
The most important limitation upon sound recordings aside from the
existence of the compulsory license of the composer's work is the lim-
itation upon exclusive rights. 8 Whereas most copyright owners have
all of the applicable rights listed in § 106, owners of copyrights in sound
recordings-that is, producers and performers-do not have the right
to exclude others from performing the work (the recording) publicly.' 9
This means that once a sound recording is produced, purchasers are
free to perform the recording without paying the producer or producers
any fee (although the composer of the underlying work may have sig-
nificant rights to royalties for each performance).
20
In addition, § 114 limits the other exclusive rights in § 106.21 For
example, the rights to exclude others from reproducing the work or
from preparing derivative works are limited severely in the case of
sound recordings to producing actual physical copies. Thus, the owner
of a sound recording can prevent others, for instance "pirates," from
actually reproducing a particular phonorecord or from preparing a de-
rivative work by using the actual sounds of its recording in a rearrange-
ment or other derivation using the actual sounds of the phonorecord.2
2
But the copyright owner cannot prevent others from simulating the re-
16 A. MILLER & M. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, at 315 (2d ed. 1990).
17 For example under §1 15(a)(1), a producer cannot duplicate another's sound recording without
the express consent of the owner of the copyright in the sound recording.
18 MILLER & DAVIS, at 316.
19 Id. and 17 U.S.C.A. §106.
20 Id.
21 Id. and 17 U.S.C.A. §114.
22 Id.
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cording or derivations "even though such sounds imitate or simulate
those in the copyrighted sound recording.''23
3. Cases regarding infringement of copyright for musical compositions: Sub-
stantial similarity/access
Infringement of copyright for musical compositions is evident in
cases that involve substantial similarity/access. In Selle v. Gibb24 the
Bee Gees hit "How Deep Is Your Love" was alleged to be an in-
fringement of a song by a song by a Chicago-based composer called
"Let it End." There, the court held that in order for the striking sim-
ilarity between a copyrighted work and an allegedly infringing work to
establish a reasonable inference of access to the copyrighted work, it
must be shown that the similarity is of a type that will preclude any
explanation other than that of copying.25 In this case, the plaintiff Selle
failed to show this. To win based on copyright infringement, Selle
needed a great amount of substantial similarity and a good amount of
access. Selle had neither.
In a second case, Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller-Brewing Co., Inc. ,26
the rap group the Fat Boys declined to appear in a commercial and
advertising campaign for Miller Brewing. Instead, a 30-second com-
mercial featuring Joe Piscopo as the three Fat Boys lookalikes was aired
on prime-time national television repeatedly. The Fat Boys then sued
Miller Brewing, Piscopo, and Backer & Spielvogel (the advertising
agency) for copyright infringement, false designation of origin, unfair
competition, and state statutory and common-law claims. The court in
this case, unlike in Midler, held that the privacy and publicity statutes
prohibiting the use of a person's name, portrait, or picture for advertis-
ing or trade purposes without that person's consent does not extend to
the use of soundalikes.
27
The Tin Pan court noted that the Midler commercial did not use
Midler's name or picture. 2t The court further noted that although the
23 MILLER & DAVIs, at 317 and 17 U.S.C.A. §l14(b).
24 Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7Th Cir. 1984).
25 Id. See also Repp v. Webber, 947 F.Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), a similar case involving
comparison of song structure and melodic content. In Repp, Andrew Lloyd Webber brought a
counterclaim against the composer of the allegedly infringing song, "Till You," based on sub-
stantial similarity to his own composition, "Close Every Door." While acknowledging similarity
in phrasing and melodic pitch in the two songs, the court found no substantial similarity based on
harmonies of varying complexity 'as well as different meter and song structure. Id. at 113.
26 Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co. Inc., 737 F.Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
27 Id. at 827.
28 Id.
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defendants were held to have misappropriated Midler's property and
thus committed a tort under California law, New York Civil Rights
Law does not yet extend to soundalikes.2 9 Therefore, the court granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
In Gaste v. Kaiserman,30 a French composer brought a copyright
infringement action against a Brazilian singer/composer and the pub-
lisher of the song "Feelings." The court held that for purposes of the
copying claim, sufficient evidence existed to show that the defendants
had direct access to the copyrighted song or access could be inferred
from the striking similarity between the songs.3' Evidence showed that
the French composer's former employee responsible for distributing
materials to foreign subpublishers testified that, in the 1950s, he gave
a recording of the song and sent copies of sheet music to the publisher's
owner. This finding undercut the publisher's argument that it was un-
aware of the existence of the French song. Thus, this case can be dis-
tinguished from Gibb because here, evidence of access to the song is
clearly evident; in Gibb, it was not.
Another case in the area of substantial similarity and access is one
in which the plaintiff establishes neither of the two elements. In Black
v. Gosdin,32 a copyright owner of a song brought an action against
alleged infringers under the Copyright Act. The alleged infringers' mo-
tion for summary judgment was granted because the copyright owner
failed to establish substantial similarity and access. The two songs had
the same idea or theme and that was all. An idea alone is not protected
by copyright.33 The court further noted that in country music, there exist
a finite number of "stock" themes, so a certain amount of similarity
follows inevitably from the choice of such "stock" themes as a juke-
box, a bar, a jilted lover, and so forth. This series of cases demonstrates
the importance of substantial similarity and access to any possible copy-
right protection of soundalike recordings.3 4
4. Summary
The Fermata test, the Copyright Act and the limitations regarding
production, and the substantial similarity/access cases thus serve as var-
ious sources through which copyright infringement in music may be
29 Id. at 826.
30 Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061 (2nd Cir. 1988).
31 Id.
32 Black v. Gosdin, 740 F.Supp. 1288 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).
33 17 U.S.C.A. §102(b).
34 Id. at 1288, 1289.
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determined. The decision by a court as to which one is most appropriate
depends upon the particular facts of a given case as well as whether a
composition (underlying work), performance, or recording is involved.
B. Fair use and the protection of commercial interests in music
1. Fair use and music
The § 107 fair use test is useful for the purpose of explaining how
commercial interests in music can be protected in general and it in-
volves four factors: 1) the nature of the copyrighted work (creative,
imaginative, original, substantial investment of time and labor); 2) the
purpose and character of the alleged infringing use (commercial, non-
profit); 3) the extent of the copying (measured with respect to the copy-
righted work); and 4) the effect of the alleged infringing use on the
potential market of the copyrighted work.35 Where a claim of fair use
is made, a balance must be struck between the benefit that the public
will derive if the use is permitted and the personal gain that the copy-
right owner will receive if the use is denied. 36
When applied to parody and burlesque, the test for fair use em-
phasizes purpose and intent over proportional, quantitative, or even
qualitative measurements 7.3 The test is not simply how much was taken
but, rather, the purpose served by the taking and the reasonableness of
the taking in light of the purpose. 38 The meaning of substantiality as a
measure of infringement in parody or burlesque has become equivalent
to "excessive. ' ' 39 The test of substantiality is whether the taking is
substantial in light of all of the circumstances, one of which would be
whether the challenged work was a parody.40 For purposes of this ar-
ticle, parody is "a musical work in which the style of an author or
work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule," 41 and burlesque
is "a dramatic work that seeks to ridicule by means of grotesque ex-
aggeration or comic imitation. ' 42
35 17 U.S.C.A. § 107. Under §107, the "fair use of a copyrighted work.. .for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching,. . scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright."
36 MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2nd Cir. 1981).
37 MILLER & DAVIS, at 361.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 363.
41 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 857 (1981).
42 Id. at 189.
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2. Musical parody and fair use: Parody cases
In Fisher v. Dees,43 radio personality Rick Dees performed the
parody "When Sonny Sniffs Glue," which was intended to poke fun
at "When Sunny Gets Blue" and the unique vocal range of the singer
and thus could qualify as parody for purposes of the fair use doctrine.
A presumption against the application of the fair use doctrine for a
work that is of a commercial nature can be rebutted by showing that
the parody does not unfairly diminish the economic value of the original
work.
44
Dees successfully rebutted this presumption because his commer-
cial parody was not primarily an attempt to capitalize financially on the
plaintiffs original work.45 This case is somewhat unlike Midler in that
whereas Midler involved identical themes, in Dees only 6 of 38 bars
were similar.46 Dees, therefore, supports the proposition that soundalike
musical recordings can be linked to fair use as outlined in the Copyright
Act, and that the potential exists for copyright protection of soundalike
musical recordings.
Finally, Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell,47 provides an in-depth
discussion of fair use, especially the fourth factor, effect on the market.
In Campbell, the holder of the copyright of the song "Oh, Pretty
Woman" sued 2 Live Crew for copyright infringement. 2 Live Crew's
song "Pretty Woman" was a parody of "Oh, Pretty Woman." The
allegedly infringing version began with the same lyrics as the original,
but became a play on words, substituting predictable lyrics with shock-
ing ones, and transforming the physical attributes of the subject woman
from a pleasing image of femininity to a woman who was bald-headed,
hairy, and generally repugnant.48 In doing so, 2 Live Crew sought to
make a derisive demonstration of how bland and banal the original song
was to the parodying group.
49
The district court held that for purposes of determining fair use,
the potential market of the copyrighted song was not affected by the
satiric versions, because the markets for the respective versions were
different, even though the copyright holder claimed that its ability to
produce a satiric version was impeded and that the impact of the crit-
43 Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432 (91h Cir. 1986).
44 Id. and 17 U.S.C.A. §107(1).
45 Dees, at 433.
46 Id.
47 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 754 F.Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
48 Id. at 1151.
49 Id.
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icism implicit in the satiric version would hurt the original.5 0 The court
further noted that although the song name was virtually the same and
key lyrics were identical, and the same guitar refrain and opening drum
beat, melody, and chorus were used, the 2 Live Crew version appro-
priated no more from the original than was necessary to reasonably
accomplish its parodic purpose. 1 Therefore, Campbell and 2 Live Crew
engaged in fair use under §107.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, based on finding
that 2 Live Crew's parody was not fair use of the copyrighted song. 2
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded that decision, holding that
commercial character of a song parody did not create a presumption
against fair use.53 Justice Souter, writing for the Court, noted that no
such evidentiary presumption was available to address the first fair use
factor, the character and purpose of the use, or the fourth, market harm,
in determining whether a transformative use, such as parody was a fair
one. 4 The court also erred in holding that 2 Live Crew had necessarily
copied excessively from the Roy Orbison original, considering the pa-
rodic purpose of the use.5
3. Summary
These two cases underscore the validity of the concepts previously
discussed regarding fair use and commercial interests. For example, the
courts in the two cases emphasize purpose and intent over proportional,
quantitative, and qualitative measurements. In Campbell, although the
two songs in question were similar, the extent of the appropriation was
reasonable to serve the parodic purpose. Dees and Campbell, thus, sup-
port the importance of intent and purpose in cases regarding musical
parody.
IV. THE DILEMMA OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION THE "BLOOD, SWEAT
& TEARS" CASE STUDY
The theme of this section might as well be "where do we draw
the line" for copyright protection of soundalike recordings and just
what exactly should be copyrightable? Voices? Production techniques?
50 Id.
51 Id. at 1157.
52 Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, reh'g denied, cert. granted in part 113
S.Ct. 1642, rev'd 114 S.Ct. 1164, on remand 25 F.3d 297.
53 Campbell, 114 S.Ct. at 1164.




Instrumentation? In the late 1960s and early 1970s jazz-rock invaded
popular music with the likes of the Electric Flag, Chicago, and Blood,
Sweat & Tears as well as their more bombastic and derivative descen-
dants, Ides of March and Chase. The music of Blood, Sweat & Tears
can be used as a model to analyze the various problems in protecting
different musical elements.
Example 1: Protection of the Song as a Whole
On the first Blood, Sweat & Tears (BS&T) album is a song penned
by Harry Nilsson called "Without Her." '5 6 The BS&T version was a
jazz-tinged, nightclub-style number with the trumpeter and saxophonist
trading four-bar solos. The Herb Alpert version released a year later in
1969 had no solos and added an orchestral arrangement, but otherwise
had the same tempo, the same restrained lead vocal, and was approx-
imately the same length.17 Was there copyright infringement? No, be-
cause the two versions were not substantially similar, the BS&T version
was not an original song, and the singers' voices lacked the same tim-
bre,5 8 unlike in Midler.
A more challenging and intriguing example is England Dan &
John Ford Coley's version of Todd Rundgren's "Love Is the Answer"
in the late 1970s.s9 Except for a saxophone part, the arrangement is the
same, the instrumentation is the same, the tempo is the same and Dan
Seals' phrasing and delivery closely emulates that of Todd Rundgren's
original, note for note. Copyright infringement? Here, we may be in
Midler territory.
In Rundgren's original, with his band Utopia, the sounds are fixed
in a tangible medium of expression. Rundgren wrote the song and but
for Rundgren's own vocal, seals might not have independently chosen
to phrase the vocal in the manner that he did. Further, unlike in Gibb,
both substantial similarity and access can be shown. Rundgren could
argue that the derivative version was not at all an "original, work of
authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression." Or Rundgren
could do what he apparently did; collect songwriter's royalties from the
newer version, a Top 10 hit. Protection of the song as a whole, then,
56 Blood, Sweat & Tears, "Without Her," on Child Is Father to the Man, CBS 9619.
57 Herb Alpert, "Without Her," on Foursider, A&M 3521.
58 See previous two footnotes.
59 England Dan & John Ford Coley, "Love Is the Answer," on The Best of England Dan and
John Ford Coley, Big Tree/Warner Bros. 76018; and Utopia, "Love Is the Answer," on Oops!
Wrong Planet, Rhino/Bearsville 70870.
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requires an examination of the individual creative and artistic elements
in each song and an analysis of similarity and access.
Example 2: Protection of the Artist's Voice
For their second album, big-voiced lead singer David Clayton-
Thomas joined BS&T. Though reviled by The Rolling Stone Album
Guide as a "scenery-chewer of a singer," at the time, his distinctive
vocal style fit the music and was often emulated by other artists for
better or worse. 60 When Jeff Beck was in his fusion mode, he brought
in Bob Tench, a similar-styled lead singer. With Jim Peterik, another
such vocalist singing lead, his band Ides of March made "Vehicle" a
number two hit in 197061 Copyright infringement? No. Although access
may be shown, the comparisons collapse at the substantial similarity
stage. A vocal style may be appropriated as one's own. Tony Bennett
and countless other vocalists have used Frank Sinatra's vocal style.
Jason Scheff's ballad phrasing is eerily similar to that of the man he
replaced with Chicago, Peter Cetera. In addition, infinite examples of
such vocal similarities exist in popular music. To allow a voice to be
protected demands a case-by-case analysis and a point-by-point ex-
amination of the facts as they relate to the Fermata test.
Example 3: The David Clayton-Thomas Lawsuit
In 1989, Milli Vanilli released a song called "All or Nothing,"
which has a melody that is almost identical to BS&T's "Spinning
Wheel." 62 Not surprisingly, about six months later, David Clayton-Tho-
mas sued Milli Vanilli for infringing use of his composition. In the
absence of an out-of-court settlement, there is no published record of
the case.
What argument does Clayton-Thomas have? The tempo, meter,
structure, style, composition, and presentation are sufficiently similar to
support a finding of copyright infringement. An argument against sub-
stantial similarity would be based on the songs' lyrics being dissimilar
as well as the Milli Vanilli version lacking a horn arrangement. Access
would have to be proved in absence of an overwhelming amount of
substantial similarity.
60 A. DECURTIS, THE ROLLING STONE ALBUM GUIDE (1992).
61 Ides of March, "Vehicle," on Billboard Top Rock 'n'Roll Hits-1970, Rhino 70631.
62 Blood, Sweat & Tears, "Spinning Wheel," on Blood, Sweat & Tears, CBS, 9720; and Milli
Vanilli, "All or Nothing," Arista 8592.
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A § 107 fair use argument operates against Milli Vanilli. First, the
original version was creative, imaginative, and represented a substantial
investment of time and labor made in anticipation of a financial return.
Second, the purpose and character of the alleged infringing use is com-
mercial in motivation. Third, the copying or paraphrasing use is com-
mercial in motivation. Third, the copying or paraphrasing of melody is
extensive in terms of quality and should, therefore, not be considered
reasonable. The weakest argument for the plaintiff is the fourth factor;
Milli Vanilli's song never hurt the market of the copyrighted song,
because each group's music catered to different musical tastes.
63
To synthesize the points made in this section, the question of
"where to draw the line" requires an answer that addresses what is
being copied, how much of it is copied, how similar are the recordings,
and does the alleged infringing party have access? Based on these ex-
amples, a plaintiff will most likely win if the song is appropriated by
an artist who releases an unrelated but substantially similar-sounding
recording and if access may be shown with no fair use. Protection of
an artist's vocal style will not be protected. But what was at issue in
Midler was not Midler's vocal style, but the instantly recognizable tim-
bre of her voice. Whether vocal timbre should be protected merits fur-
ther discussion.
V. THE EXTENSION OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION TO A MIDLER-TYPE
SITUATION
A. Why Midler is not currently covered by copyright law
The court in Midler did not discuss copyright issues beyond noting
that voice is not a tangible medium of expression. 64 However, infer-
ences can be drawn that the court did not find the facts to fall within
the scope of copyright infringement issues, fair use, and parody. To
understand how copyright law can cover a Midler-type situation, an
examination of why the Midler court ruled as it did is necessary.
1. Infringement of copyright for musical compositions
The Fermata test does not apply to the protection of a voice be-
cause Fermata addresses copyright of musical composition-the appro-
priation of an artist's work-whereas in Midler the focus was on
appropriation of an artist's identity or voice. Regarding the relevant
63 Id.
64 Midler, at 462.
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case law, the court in Tin Pan Apple explained that the privacy and
publicity issues do not relate to soundalikes.65 Rather, only a person's
name, portrait, or picture is covered. The substantial similarity/access
cases generally discuss what is appropriated rather than how; that is,
something tangible is involved to show whether a defendant appropri-
ated an original artist's work.66 A tape or piece of sheet music can help
illustrate what has been taken. This is difficult to demonstrate in Midler.
How can someone prove direct access to a voice for example? The
problem to date in Midler has been that a voice is not copyrightable.
2. Fair use and parody
Fair use cases regarding music involve parody as suggested earlier.
Midler involved using an artist's identity in a commercial context to
promote a particular product.67 The advertising agency tried to use and
take advantage of Bette Midler's existing popularity. 68 However, this is
not what parody is about. Parody involves an artist using a new work
to make fun of an existing work. Thus, Midler does not fall within the
scope of commercial parody.
B. Why copyright protection is necessary and proper for celebrity soundalike
recordings
1. Secondary meaning
The concept of secondary meaning is rooted in trademark law, not
copyright law. 69 A descriptive term is ineligible for trademark protec-
tion unless it acquires secondary meaning.70 That is, a descriptive word
such as "green" is not subject to trademark protection unless it ac-
quires secondary meaning. That is, a descriptive word such as "green"
is not subject to trademark protection if used in the phrase "green
onions.' ' T However, if a company named "Green" sells onions as
"Green onions," people who purchase the product may, over time,
associate the words together.72 This association on the part of buyers is
an indicator of secondary meaning and loss of descriptiveness.73 Such
65 See footnotes 26 through 29 and related text.
66 See section ILIA3.
67 Midler, at 461.
68 Id.
69 MILLER & DAVIs, at 163.






association is not obtained immediately, but rather evolves over time
as the product is used and as the investment and effort regarding the
making and selling of the product takes place. 74
The problem of protecting an artist's voice has been that it is not
fixed and in a tangible medium of expression under copyright law.
Now, however, the concept of secondary meaning should protect Bette
Midler's voice in a copyright context. A distinctive celebrity's voice,
such as that of Bette Midler becomes instantly recognized over time
because of the time and effort put into the recording process by the
artist. As with the "Green onions" example, a distinctive voice can be
easily associated with particular songs by the record-buying public.
Under the Lanham Act, it is not important that a mark be descrip-
tive as well as distinctive.75 The only requirement is that a mark be
primarily distinctive rather than primarily descriptive. 76 A voice can
become primarily distinctive to an audience that regularly listens to
songs that are regularly released by the artist and that are often played
by a radio station. A distinctive voice can become fixed over time
because of secondary meaning. The distinctiveness of the artist's voice
and the subsequent audience association should fall within the scope of
copyright law to protect an artist's creativity and to guard against mis-
appropriation of that artist's work and labor.
2. Why protection of a celebrity soundalike recording is particularly compel-
ling
Not every singer's voice is worthy of copyright protection. The
protection of a voice that is not familiar to the public is not as worthy
of protection as one that is, such as that of Bette Midler. Several reasons
exist for protection of a distinctive, recognizable voice: First, the Copy-
right Act exists to reward creativity, not to punish a commercially suc-
cessful vocalist by allowing others to appropriate her sound against her
will and for their own commercial use. Second, to use a celebrity voice
in a context (a commercial) other than that originally intended by the
artist (an album, a song) raises moral issues. The alleged infringer's
conduct risks prejudice of the original artist's honor and reputation. Just
as colorization may distort an original director's work against his will,
so too can a celebrity's voice, taken out of the original intended medium
potentially distort the audience's view of that artist's work. Third, the
74 Id. at 165.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 166.
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media or another such entity should not be permitted to exploit an
individual's identity, but merely should use an identity for informative
or cultural reasons. These three reasons apply to a celebrity performer
because she can potentially suffer economic loss and damage to her
reputation. These factors are less likely to be evident with an unknown
vocalist because the public is less likely to establish secondary meaning
with that artist's voice. Therefore, protection of an original celebrity
artist's voice and work should be protected by copyright law.
3. When is protection appropriate?
Protection is appropriate when 1) enough of the artist's past work
is in the public domain such that a sufficient audience exists to rec-
ognize that artist's voice and work; 2) when "celebrity" has been es-
tablished (Through album and concert sales, television appearances),
copyright protection of a voice should exist at the time any new single
or album is released; and 3) the time at which secondary meaning can
be ascertained. Billy Ray Cyrus is an example in which this process
was accelerated because his fame and fortune arrived seemingly over-
night.77 Cyrus's voice and "Achy Breaky Heart" song are now instantly
recognizable. 78 If a commercial were to have been shown on television
involving the song and a Cyrus soundalike two weeks after the original
release date of the song, infringement would exist under these three
factors. 79 The conditions were satisfied that soon. The timing of copy-
right protection by a court or jury would depend upon the particular
facts of the case and an analysis of the voice, celebrity status, and
audience association issue regarding a given artist's voice and work.
4. Factors that help make copyright infringement actionable
A related question is what factors assist in making copyright in-
fringement actionable? One way to examine this question is to look at
the granting of permission and the resulting consequences. If Ford Mo-
tor would have asked for Bette Midler's permission and she had granted
it, then no copyright infringement problem would have been present.
If, on the other hand, Midler had refused, Ford's subsequent commer-
cial would have constituted willful infringement. If Ford did not ask
for permission at all, as happened here, and then Ford made the com-
mercial, this is not willful infringement but rather is regular infringe-





ment. The second scenario (permission requested/refused) is the most
egregious conduct of the three and would result in the greatest monetary
award for Bette Midler. The reason, in part, is that in the third scenario,
Midler did not manifest her disapproval of the appropriation of her
voice so the wrong is not as great as if she had refused and Ford had
gone ahead with the ad anyway. Although intent of the alleged infringer
is not a primary consideration in a fact-finder's determination of in-
fringement (because the primary focus is on the works themselves), the
permission and willfulness analysis is relevant in establishing levels of
severity of infringing conduct that can impact monetary awards and
trigger the application of an amended §114.
5. The proposed §114 amendment: The protection of an artist's voice through
the Copyright Act itself
The purpose of § 114 is to limit the scope of exclusive rights of
the owner of a copyright in a sound recording.80 The most applicable
section for the purpose of this discussion is clause (2) of §106, which
grants the owner of a copyright the exclusive right "to prepare deriv-
ative works based on the copyrighted work."'" §114(b) limits this right
to "prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the
sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in se-
quence and quality. ' 82
"Actual sounds" should be further explained by adding "distinc-
tive voices and unique sounds that may become distinctly associated
with a particular artist."' 83 This language suggests a secondary meaning
component and provides a means through which the Copyright Act can
protect voices. "Unique sounds" is substituted for "sounds" because
some sounds, such as production techniques and instrumentation, may
not be copyrightable. "Uniqueness" increases the potential of protec-
tion of a sound through suggesting a particular, special source of that
sound.
The "rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence and
quality" language is inadequate because it fails to address exact copy-
ing without alteration, which was what was at issue in Midler.84 After
"...quality;" should be the following: "or copied exactly from their
original form." This language is more inclusive yet is not overbroad.
80 17 U.S.C.A. §106 and 17 U.S.C.A. §114.
81 17 U.S.C.A. §106(2).
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The term "derivative work," as defined within §101 is extremely com-
prehensive and, therefore, should be left as it is.85
Should "voices and unique sounds" be protected from commercial
use or imitation or both? § 114(b) includes the language "the exclusive
rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under clauses (1)
and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or duplication of
another sound/recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation
of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate those in
the copyrighted sound recording. ' 8 6 To rectify this language to encom-
pass voices, an affirmative version of the above sentence would have
to be made or in the alternative, an exception should be made for "dis-
tinctive voices and unique sounds." This is specific language that
would allow a fact-finder to determine what is unique or distinctive
based on the particular circumstances of a given case. In sum, such
revisions would enhance the possibility of Midler-type cases to be pro-
tected by federal copyright law instead of state tort law.
C. Why Altai can and should be extended to cover a Midler-type case
1. Application of Altai to soundalike musical recording context
Altai87 involves an action by Computer Associates against Altai
for copyright infringement and misappropriation of trade secrets.8 Al-
though the case is based on infringement of a computer program, the
test regarding substantial similarity/access applies to soundalike musical
recording.8 9 In Altai, Computer Associates (CA) and Altai were com-
panies in the computer software industry--designing, developing and
marketing various types of computer programs. 90 One of CA's marketed
programs entitled CA-SCHEDULER contained a sub-program entitled
ADAPTER9' ADAPTER has no independent use but plays an extremely
important role by translating the language of a given program into the
85 17 U.S.C.A. §101. "A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more pre-existing
works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture
version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which
a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annota-
tions, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of au-
thorship, is a 'derivative work."' Because this language is so broad, the Ford commercial is within
its scope.
86 17 U.S.C.A. §114(b).
87 Altai, at 1241.
88 Id. at 1244.
89 Id.




particular language that the computer's own operating system can un-
derstand.92 ADAPTER saves the user costs, both in time and money,
that otherwise would be expended in purchasing new programs, mod-
ifying existing systems to run them, and gaining familiarity with their
operation. 93
In 1982, Altai began marketing its own job-scheduling program
entitled ZEKE. An Altai employee approached a computer programmer
at CA to assist in the design. When the CA programmer joined Altai,
he brought some knowledge of ADAPTER with him and integrated it
into Altai's new program, OSCAR. 94 This was done without the knowl-
edge of any other Altai employee. In 1988, upon learning that Altai
may have appropriated parts of ADAPTER, CA brought a copyright
and trade secret misappropriation action against Altai.9
The district court held that Altai's OSCAR computer program had
infringed CA's program and thus awarded $364,444 in actual damages
and apportioned profits; that Altai's OSCAR program was not substan-
tially similar to a portion of CA-SCHEDULER called ADAPTER and
thus denied relief; and that CA's state law trade secret misappropriation
claim against Altai had been preempted by the federal copyright act.
96
The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the district court in its
entirety. 9
7
The appellate court, in its discussion of copyright protection for
the nonliteral elements of computer programs, noted that §102(a) de-
fines "literary works." 98 Nonliteral components of computer programs,
such as general flow charts, organization of inter-modular relationships,
parameters, and "macros," are protected by copyright, since nonliteral
structures of literary works are protected, and since computer programs,
although not specifically listed in § 102, are considered literary works.99
Phonorecords, conversely, are listed as literary works in § 102(a).100
By analogy, Bette Midler's voice, as a nonliteral component of the "Do
You Want to Dance" phonorecord should be protected by copyright,
because nonliteral structures (voices) within literary works (phonore-
cords) are protected, and because phonorecords are literary works.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 1247.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 1245.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1249 and 17 U.S.C.A. §102(a).
99 Altai, at 1241.
100 Id. at 1249 and 17 U.S.C.A. §102(a).
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a. Abstractions
Substantial similarity in Altai involves a three-part test.10' The "ab-
stractions" test comprises the first step in the examination of computer
programs for substantial similarity.'0 2 It involves dissecting the alleged
copied program's structure and isolating each level of abstraction con-
tained within it, beginning with the code and ending with an articulation
of the program's ultimate function.'0 3 This process requires retracing
each of the program designer's steps in the opposite order in which
they were taken during the program's creation.
104
As applied to Midler, this process would involve breaking down
the original phonorecord record's master tape to its components and
retracing each of the steps from the last production layer added back-
ward to the first; that is vocals, nonrhythm tracks, rhythm tracks. This
order is the reverse of the manner in which it was recorded.
b. Filtration
The second step in the examination of computer programs for sub-
stantial similarity is the "successive filtering" method, in which each
structural component at each level of abstraction in the allegedly copied
program is examined to determine whether its inclusion at that level
was an "idea" or was dictated by considerations of efficiency so as to
be necessarily incidental to such an idea.105 To be determined at this
step is whether the inclusion was required by factors external to the
component itself, or whether the component was taken from the public
domain and hence is nonprotectable expression; such "filtration"
serves the purpose of defining the scope of the plaintiffs copyright,
and may ultimately leave behind a core of protectable material.1
0 6
When applied to Midler, this second step entails discovering
whether each recording track is an idea or necessarily incidental to an
idea. Also, the issue of whether the track contents are taken from the
public domain must be explored. The concept of the "merger" doctrine
is relevant to this discussion because it is applicable by analogy to
literary devices, including computer programs. 0 7 In Midler, the exact




105 Id. Regrettably, this language is not explained further in the court's opinion.
106 Id.
107 The "merger" doctrine, which precludes a finding of copyright infringement if the copied
expression is inseparable from the idea expressed, applies to allegedly infringed computer pro-
grams. A court must inquire whether the use of this particular set of modules is necessary to
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vocal phrasing, instrumentation, arrangement, and production used were
not necessary to make the record. More than one means to express the
ideas existed. Different production techniques could have been used;
for example a Phil Spector "wall of sound" approach. 10 8 Alternatives
to the ultimate techniques and arrangements used were available, so
that the ones used did not merge with the idea so as to preclude copy-
right protection. As for the public domain issue, Bette Midler's voice
is not in the public domain based on the court ruling of appropriation
of her identity under state piracy law.
c. Comparison
The third step in the test for substantial similarity between nonli-
teral computer program components involves comparing the accused
program to the core of protectable expression in the allegedly infringing
program, if any, remaining after the first two steps. 10 9 The court must
determine whether the defendant copied any aspect of this protected
expression, and must assess the copied portion's importance relative to
the plaintiffs overall program. 0
In Midler, the court's substantial similarity inquiry focuses on
whether the defendants (Ford, Y&R) copied any aspect of this protected
expression, as well as an assessment of the copied portion's relative
importance with respect to Midler's recording overall."' After a court
has sifted out the items noted in the second step ("ideas," items taken
from the public domain), the remaining core of protectable expression
in terms of a work's copyright value is, in the language of the Altai
court, "the golden nugget. '""12 Ford and Y&R copied not only some
background vocals deemed inappropriate for the commercial." 3 Bette
Midler's voice is a "golden nugget" that is worthy of full copyright
protection.
This test of substantial similarity, then, is applicable to a Midler-
type situation. The three-step test removes the major roadblock to pro-
efficiently implement that part of the program's process being implemented. If the answer is yes,
then the expression represented by the programmer's choice of a specific module or group of
modules has merged with their underlying idea and is unprotected. Id. at 1254.
108 The "wall of sound" was a production technique commonly used by Phil Spector on early
1960s "girl group" recordings. It involved echo, a heavy percussive sound, and instrumentation
arranged in a loud manner.
109 Altai, at 1242.
110 Id.
Ill Id. at 1256.
112 Id.
113 Midler, at 462.
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viding copyright protection to state piracy cases in this context.'1 4
Expert testimony may be used to assist the fact-finder in determining
whether the defendant copied any part of the plaintiffs copyrighted
work. This method, by carefully distinguishing idea from expression,
will likely narrow copyright protection for soundalike musical record-
ings, comports with and advances constitutional policies underlying the
Copyright Act." 5 Its purpose is not to reward the labor of authors, but
rather to advance the public welfare through the rewarding of artistic
creativity in a manner that permits free use of nonprotectable ideas and
processes."16
2. The §114 amendment as a means to protect the "golden nugget"
Altai's purpose of breaking down a recording into its components
can facilitate the application of the § 114 amendment. Through the iso-
lation of a distinctive voice or unique sound, the fact-finder can more
easily determine whether it is sufficiently distinctive so as to be a
"golden nugget." Such a process can be much more difficult if a fact-
finder were to hear a recording in which the vocals are buried in the
mix or if the production process is so hurried such that the recording
becomes a pollution of a mix. 117
Altai, then, can most appropriately be applied to discover whether
a voice is distinctive or a sound is unique."' If it is not, then the
amended § 114 will not apply." 9 If after abstraction, filtration, and com-
parison, a fact-finder deems the voice or sound to be sufficiently dis-
tinctive so as to be associated only with that particular artist, then
copyright protection through the new §114 will more likely be possi-
ble.120
3. Application of Altai to fair use context
Given that Altai pertains to Bette Midler's voice, fair use can be
used to solidify copyright protection.'2' The second fair use factor, that
114 Access can be more easily established; the defendants used the same song with a similar
vocalist.
115 Altai, at 1242.
116 Id.
117 A good example: Graham Parker's Stick to Me, Mercury 3706. Producer Nick Lowe's
original master tapes were somehow "eaten" by a machine so that, to meet the scheduled release
date, the album was re-recorded in two weeks. The result was lead vocals that were at times almost
inaudible as well as a clash of muddled instrumentation.
118 Review concepts in section VB5.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See section ILIA1.
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the use of her voice was for commercial, not nonprofit purposes already
works in her favor.'22 The third factor concerns the extent of the copy-
ing. 23 The court in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,
1 24
suggested that for literary works, "extent" should mean "quality" be-
cause it is often impossible to speak of "most of the work.' '125 Novels,
movies, or plays cannot simply be quantified in such instances. 2 6 Thus,
the court should make a qualitative, not quantitative, judgment about
the character of the work. 127 In Midler, then, Ford and the ad agency
appropriated the quality or timbre of Midler's voice. Because of the
extensive copying and the substantial similarity of the voices, such use
is not reasonable. The fourth factor, effect on the market, is, as previ-
ously discussed, debatable. 1
28
Where Altai is of assistance is with regard to the first factor, the
nature of the copyrighted work. Altai, through its abstraction, filtration,
and comparison steps, can show how a record is created and therefore,
how a vocal can be creative, imaginative, original, and involve a sub-
stantial investment of time and labor (through a great number of takes,
for instance).129 Altai can remove the roadblock of the first factor not
being able to pertain to vocal recordings and thus enhance the likeli-
hood of fair use applying to a distinctive vocalist context.
D. The "look and feel" test as a tool to protect soundalike musical recordings
1. Description of the test
The court in Arnstein v. Porter'1a suggested a bifurcated substantial
similarity test whereby a finder of fact makes two findings of substantial
similarity to support a copyright violation.' First, the fact-finder must
decide whether sufficient similarity exists between the two works in
question to conclude that the alleged infringer used the copyrighted
work in making his own. 32 On this issue, expert testimony may be used
to aid the trier of fact. This is the "extrinsic" test of substantial simi-
122 Id.
123 Id.




128 See section IIIBI.
129 Id. and Altai, at 1253 and 1256.
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larity. Second, if the answer to the first question is in the affirmative,
the fact-finder must decide without the aid of expert testimony, but with
the perspective of the "lay observer," whether the copying was "il-
licit," or "an unlawful appropriation" of the copyrighted work. This
has been termed an "intrinsic" test of substantial similarity.'33 This
"intrinsic" test, also called the ordinary observer test, was developed
in cases involving novels, plays, and paintings.
13 4
2. Application of test to Midler
Such a test is applicable to soundalike recordings. In the context
of Midler, the "intrinsic" test is sufficient because the debate in that
case regarded the timbre, distinctiveness, and instant recognition of
Bette Midler's voice by the general public. This is not a scientific anal-
ysis. Analysis of instrumentation, production, and engineered record-
ings do not come into play. Unlike in Gibb, an expert determination of
the number of measures that are similar is not necessary. To establish
infringement through appropriation of Bette Midler's voice, an ordinary
observer or listener should find 1) that Ford and the ad agency had
access to the recording (the answer is in the affirmative here because
Bette Midler's albums remained in the marketplace and were readily
obtainable by anyone); and 2) that as lay observers and listeners, the
voice in the Ford ad sounds substantially similar to that of Bette Midler.
Given that Midler's original and imitated voices are easily audible in
both the recording and the commercial, a lay jury is an appropriate unit
to make a determination.
3. Application of test to other soundalike musical recording contexts
What if, however, there exist situations with vocals that involve
technical knowledge of music? Would expert testimony be appropriate
in such a context? Yes. Recently, a former vocalist with the Mary Jane
Girls, Yvette Marine either sued or threatened to sue Paula Abdul after
alleging that she and Abdul created a composite vocal on a song on
Abdul's first album called "Opposites Attract."' 35 In other words, Ma-
rine alleged that the vocal on the recording was not exclusively that of
Abdul. 3 6 This tactic of composite vocals is not uncommon in popular
music. Patrick Leonard created composite vocals when producing Ma-
133 Id.
134 Altai, at 1258, 1259.
135 Paula Abdul, "Opposites Attract," on Forever Your Girl, Virgin 86067. The Yvette Marine




donna's albums in the late 1980s. 13 7 Usually such a process is utilized
when the primary vocalist is thin-voiced, has intonation problems, or
has limited range.
Unlike in Midler, then, the full Arnstein test should be used. The
composite vocal concept is not intuitively obvious to a casual listener of
music; expert testimony is necessary to explain what is a composite vocal,
how it is achieved, and why it is significant in establishing copyright
infringement. Once such expert testimony is used to aid the trier of fact,
then the jury can decide whether Paula Abdul unlawfully appropriated
Marine's voice. Under this test, however, Marine is unlikely to win be-
cause the jury is unlikely to link Abdul's voice to the original recordings
on which Marine sang lead with the Mary Jane Girls (of which there were
few). Thus, any suit would collapse, particularly in the access analysis.
Similarity, let alone substantial similarity would be hard to establish. Ma-
rine's voice is not distinctive like Bette Midler's, so the jury is less likely
to find the need for copyright protection to be as compelling.
4. Exceptions to the application of the "look and feel" test
The "look and feel" test would not apply to a recording in which
the vocalist imitates an original vocalist's style instead of timbre. For
example, John Cafferty imitated Bruce Springsteen's echoed rock vocal
sound in his song "On the Dark Side."' 38 Likewise, his band imitated the
hard-hitting, basement sound of the E-Street Band most commonly heard
on "Glory Days" and other such Springsteen songs of the period. 3 9
The alleged infringing use, then, can determine the applicability
of the "look and feel" test. If the use of the original voice is for another
artist's song, a court or jury may view such a use to be less likely an
infringing use than if the original voice was used in a commercial or
another such purpose to which the artist might not want to lend his
voice and name.
Distinctive characteristics of a vocalist's style will not be protected
through a "look and feel" analysis. Buddy Holly's "hiccup" and
James Brown's scream have been appropriated by other vocalists with-
out the filing of a suit. In fact, James Brown's scream has been copied
so often by other soul, and rhythm and blues artists so as to possibly
fall within the scope of scenes a faire for being so common.
137 Example: Madonna, True Blue, Sire 25442.
138 John Cafferty and the Beaver Brown Band, "On the Dark Side," on Eddie and the Cruisers,
Scotti Bros. 38929.
139 Bruce Springsteen, "Glory Days," on Born in the U.S.A., CBS 38653.
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Commercial pop vocalists that coincidentally sound alike will not
be able to file claims against one another. To an ordinary radio listener,
Kim Carnes sounds a lot like Rod Stewart. Yet, Rod Stewart could not
sue Kim Carnes for having appropriated the timbre of his voice on
"Bette Davis Eyes."'
40
Finally, production techniques such as looping and forms of in-
strumentation will not be protected by "look and feel" concepts. The
Phil Spector "wall of sound," for instance, is not something that a lay
listener would identify with Phil Spector. An average listener who is
familiar with the music of the Ronettes or George Harrison may never
have heard of Phil Spector. Given the common use of such techniques
and instrumentation and the idea that protecting the appropriation of
the identity of a behind-the-scenes figure is not as compelling as pro-
tecting that of a famous singer, copyright infringement will not exist in
this situation.
5. "Look and feel" analysis: Conclusion
The court in Whelan Associates141 noted that the ordinary observer
test is of doubtful value in cases involving computer programs on ac-
count of the programs' complexity and unfamiliarity to most members
of the public. Similarly, the more technical the subject matter (produc-
tion techniques, etc.), the more expert testimony is needed and the more
desirable the application of the full Arnstein test. The court's determi-
nation of whether both expert and lay analysis is to be used or merely
lay analysis will depend on the technicality of the subject matter.
VI. CONCLUSION
The application of the Altai and "look and feel" concepts will
expand the scope of protection for soundalike musical recordings in
general and celebrity soundalike recordings in particular. No longer
should protection of a distinctive voice be limited to a state piracy tort
case. Since Congress intended copyright protection of literal elements,
including phonograph records, so too should the Copyright Act protect
the nonliteral elements that phonograph records encompass. Such a
measure will advance the public welfare through the protection and
rewarding of artistic creativity.
140 Kim Carnes, "Bette Davis Eyes," on Gypsy Honeymoon: The Best of Kim Carnes, EIA
98223
141 Whelan, at 1232.
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